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On 24th October 2005 an unemployed man from Hong Kong, Chan 
Nai Ming aka “Big Crook”, received the dubious honour of becoming 
the first person in the world to be sentenced to a custodial sentence for 
using the Bit Torrent protocol to infringe copyright. 1  This chapter 
explores the definitions of “affect prejudicially” and “distribution” in the 
context of criminal law; issues which emerged from the case. 
 
THE TECHNOLOGY 
Bit Torrent is open source file-sharing protocol that can be used to 
disseminate any type of computer file. Any program that implements the 
protocol is known as a Bit Torrent “client”. 
 Three elements are required for the system to function correctly: (1) a 
file to share (“the shared file”); (2) its corresponding “torrent” file, 
which contains metadata about the shared file; and (3) a tracking 
computer (“a tracker”) which locates other clients that are uploading or 
downloading the shared file. A Bit Torrent user creates the torrent file 
using a client and uploads it to a newsgroup site (which typically also 
functions as the tracker 2 ), but keeps the shared file on their own 
computer. Other Bit Torrent users download the torrent file from the 
                                                        
1 ‘Jail for BitTorrent bandit ‘Big Crook’’, Sydney Morning Herald, May 18 2007, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/security/jail-for-bittorrent-bandit-big-
crook/2007/05/18/1178995417708.html> 25 January 2008. 
2 The notorious Swedish website The Pirate Bay <http://thepiratebay.org/> operates in 
this manner. 
Criminal infringement of copyright: the Big Crook case 
 
368 
newsgroup site and their Bit Torrent client software will download and 
exchange parts of the shared file with other users using the same tracker, 
in what is known as a “swarm”. The parts of the shared file that a user 
has already downloaded become available to the other users in the 
swarm, so each user almost immediately becomes part of the 
dissemination process. This means that if there is no user who has a 
complete copy of the shared file (“a seeder”) in the swarm, a complete 
copy of the shared file can still be created by other users transferring 
different parts of the shared file to each other. In plain English, this 
means that files containing copyrighted films, music, software, etc. can 
be easily and quickly transferred between computers. 
 
THE FACTS  
On 10 January 2005, while browsing a (now defunct) film newsgroup 
site, a customs officer came upon a post from a member calling himself 
“Big Crook”. Accompanying the post was a torrent file for the film 
Daredevil3 which the officer used to successfully transfer a copy of the 
film from “Big Crook’s” computer. 4  The next day the officer 
downloaded the films Red Planet5 and Miss Congeniality6 using the same 
method.7 Customs officers traced the IP address of “Big Crook” from 
the newsgroup message, presumably obtained his residential address 
from the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) and raided Chan’s flat 
“where he was found sitting at a computer and surfing the internet”8. 
They seized legitimate copies of the three films, a digital camera used to 
make images relating to the films and Chan’s computer.9 A forensic 
expert analysed the computer and concluded that it was the original 
source from which copies had been downloaded by the Customs officer 
and others.10  
                                                        
3 See <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0287978/> at 3 December 2007. 
4 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 260. 
5 See <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0199753/> at 3 December 2007. 
6 See <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0212346/> at 3 December 2007.  
7 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 260. 
8 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 260. 
9 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 260. 
10 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 260. 
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THE MAGISTRATES’ DECISION  
Chan faced three charges under s159G of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200 
arising from offences under the then s 118(1)(f) of the Copyright 
Ordinance, Cap 528. 11  Section 159G codifies the law of attempts and 
s118(1)(f) confers the substantive offence that Chan was accused of 
attempting. Section 118(1)(f) stated: 
A person commits an offence if he, without the licence of the 
copyright owner, distributes (otherwise than for the purpose of, in 
the course of, or in connection with, any trade or business) to such 
an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, an 
infringing copy of a copyright work.12 
Three alternate charges were brought for obtaining access to a computer 
with dishonest intent, contrary to s 161(1)(c) of the  Crimes Ordinance, Cap 
200. Chan was found guilty of the first three charges and no verdict was 
given for the alternate charges.13 Chan failed in both his appeals to the 
High Court14 and the Court of Final Appeal.15 
The main issues that emerged from the hearing were: (a) whether or not 
the extent of Chan’s activities was sufficient to “affect prejudicially the 
copyright owner” 16  had he succeeded in his attempt; and (b) the 
meaning of the word “distribute”.17 
 
                                                        
11 Section 118 has been amended by the Copyright (Amendment) Ordinance 2007 
since this case commenced. The offence Chan was charged with still exists, and is 
found at s 118(1)(g) of the amended Copyright Ordinance, Cap 528. 
12 Copyright Ordinance, Cap 528 (1 April 2001) s 118(1)(f) amended by Copyright 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2007. 
13 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 153. 
14 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1. 
15 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255. 
16 Copyright Ordinance, Cap 528 (1 April 2001) s 118(1)(f) amended by Copyright 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2007. 
17 Copyright Ordinance, Cap 528 (1 April 2001) s 118(1)(f) amended by Copyright 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2007. 
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 PREJUDICE  
The term “affect prejudicially” can be found in the copyright offence 
provisions of a large number of countries in the former British 
Commonwealth 18 , but its meaning has received little or no judicial 
analysis. The “three step test” in art 9(2) of the Berne Convention19 uses 
similar language to the offence provisions, stating “Members shall 
confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special 
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder”20, 
but the ambiguity of this term leaves it open to a variety of 
interpretations. In Chan’s case Magistrate Colin Mackintosh took a very 
wide view of what is mean by the term: 
Prejudice in this context is not necessarily restricted economic 
prejudice, though that is the obvious area at which attention is 
directed.  It might be said that (for example in the case of Miss 
Congeniality, charge 3,) the distribution of one copy to a customs 
officer, who would never otherwise have bought it, in the context 
of  local sales since release in 2001 of over 50,000 copies, barely 
amounted to significant prejudice.  If that is a correct analysis, then 
given that the intention of the defendant must have been to 
distribute much more widely than simply to one downloader, his 
acts amounted to an attempt to distribute to such an extent as to 
affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, within the context 
of section 159G(1) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.  It is 
inevitable that distribution to 30 or 40 or more downloaders would 
involve prejudice to the copyright owners through unauthorised 
distribution of their intellectual property and lost sales.  And 
though lost sales, in the context of the evidence in this case, might 
be small, nevertheless, such losses would amount to a prejudicial 
effect.21   
                                                        
18 See Copyright Act (Canada) s 42(1)(c); Copyright Act (Jamaica) s 46(1)(d); 
Copyright Act (Singapore) s 136(2)(b); Copyright Act 1968 (Australia) s 132AI(2)(d); 
and Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (England and Wales) s 107(1)(e). 
19 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886. 
20 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886 art 9(2).  
21 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 152. 
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The question of whether or not the extent of the distribution is 
sufficiently widespread to affect prejudicially the copyright owner, as Mr 
Mackintosh correctly stated, is in part dependent on the size of the 
market for legitimate copies, but this is not a complete picture. To state 
that it is “inevitable that distribution to 30 or 40 or more downloaders”22 
demonstrates perhaps, that the continual propagation and repetition of 
the industry view (i.e. that each case of infringement equates to a lost 
sale) has had its desired effect of becoming the hegemonic view of the 
popular discourse. Although Mr Mackintosh acknowledged that the 
“distribution of one copy to a customs officer, who would never otherwise 
have bought it” would have “barely amounted to significant prejudice” he 
did not explore this analysis further, and did not consider the possibility that 
none of the potential recipients of Chan’s infringing copies may have ever 
bought legitimate copies, or even, that one or more of those recipients may 
have bought a legitimate copy because they watched an infringing copy. 
Mr Mackintosh stated the scope of what was meant by “affect 
prejudicially” was not limited merely to the financial impact of an 
unauthorised distribution: 
Potential lost sales are not the only measure of prejudice.  There is, 
for instance, the movie rental market to be considered.  And 
copyright owners plainly suffer prejudice from such piracy as this 
beyond simply their sales figures.  The widespread existence of 
counterfeits tends to degrade the genuine article and undermines 
the business of copyright owners.23 
These statements concerning the prejudicial effect on the rental market 
are again couched in terms of the damage “piracy”24 in general does to 
the film industry, rather than the actual prejudicial effect caused or 
attempted to be caused by Chan. It might be a plausible argument that 
the cumulative effect of large numbers of Bit Torrent users distributing 
infringing copies prejudicially affect copyright owners beyond a direct 
financial impact of lost sales, but it is difficult to see how an individual 
charged with distributing 30 or 40 infringing copies could be held 
responsible to any measurable degree for the fortunes of the film rental 
                                                        
22 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 152. 
23 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 152. 
24 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 152. 
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market, particularly when the offence in question has not been 
completed.  
Since Chan was charged with an attempt, Mr Mackintosh only needed to 
find that Chan’s actions implied the necessary specific intent required to 
convict. Ribeiro J suggested that the mens rea of the offence requires an 
intention to distribute widely enough that it prejudicially affects the 
copyright owner: 
“The reason why the prosecution resorted to the offence of 
attempt was to avoid any difficulties that might be posed by the 
requirement in the full offence of showing that distribution was 
to such an extent as to cause prejudice to the copyright 
owner.”25 
This is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this case. It meant that one 
of the crucial elements of the actus reus, a threshold test to assess the 
damage caused to the victim, was instead left to Mr Mackintosh’s 
estimation of (a) Chan’s state of mind; and (b) the film buying habits of 
imaginary recipients of non-existent infringing copies. Chan’s legal team 
did not seek to appeal on any grounds raised by this issue, and 
regrettably, since the finding of specific intent was a matter of fact and 
not law, it is understandable why it was not pursued. It was suggested in 
the Court of Final Appeal that Chan had passively allowed other users to 
make their own copies, an argument that was rejected by Ribeiro J: 
“After taking the numerous preparatory steps described, he 
kept his computer connected with the network and continued 
to run the software to ensure that entire copies of the films 
would be transferred to the downloaders. It would be wrong to 
mistake his use of automated means (ie the BitTorrent 
software) to achieve his purpose for mere passivity on his 
part”26 
This would also suggest however, that Chan did not know, much less 
cared, how many other users were transferring files from his computer. 
There is perhaps, an argument to be made that he was merely reckless or 
                                                        
25 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 258. 
26 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 270. 
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negligent in his state of mind and lacked the specific intent to distribute 
the infringing copies to the extent required.  
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISON  
Chan chose instead to appeal on the following grounds to the High 
Court: 
“[1] The Magistrate erred in law by failing to recognise that the 
offence under section 118(1)(f) of the Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 
528) is concerned with distribution of infringing copies, and not 
merely distribution of data/information.  Consistent with this 
error, the Magistrate failed to take note of the meaning of “copy” 
as defined in section 23(2) of the Copyright Ordinance, which 
requires that a “copy” must be in a “material form”, i.e. a physical 
material entity. 
  Consequently, the Magistrate erred in law by: -  
(a) confusing the concept of distribution of data/information with 
distribution of copies, and equating the former with the latter; 
(b) failing to recognise that distribution of copies in the context of 
the Copyright Ordinance must involve distribution of physical 
material entities 
[2] The Magistrate erred in law by finding the Appellant’s acts 
constituted a distribution (or an attempted distribution) of the 
films the subject of the charges under section 118(1)(f) of the 
Copyright Ordinance: - 
(a) The finding is contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution 
expert, which clearly suggested that the downloading process of 
each downloader using the BitTorrent technology was initiated by 
the downloader himself and that it was the downloader’s own 
decision which directly caused the creation of the copy in the 
downloader’s computer. 
(b) The Magistrate’s reasoning at most supports the contention 
that the Appellant’s acts played a crucial part in facilitating or 
assisting the downloaders in making copies in their own 
computers.  It does not lead to the conclusion that the Appellant’s 
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acts amounted to distribution of copies as the making of the copies 
was initiated and directly caused by the downloaders themselves. 
[3] This ground related to the fact that although the Magistrate did 
not deliver verdicts on the alternative charges, he nevertheless 
expressed his view that the charges could have been made out.  
Although this ground of appeal refers to a so-called finding, there 
was no finding made nor verdict given against which the Appellant 
can appeal.  Accordingly, for the purposes of the appeal this 
ground was not argued. 
[4] This was a catchall submission that the convictions were unsafe 
and unsatisfactory under all the circumstances”27 
Justice Beeson considered the arguments in grounds one and two, but 
found that neither of these grounds were made out and dismissed the 
appeal.28 She stated: 
“No real assistance can be derived from a comparison of the 
historical development of legislation in Hong Kong and the UK, 
interesting though it might be.  Nor can any weight be given to the 
Appellant’s insistence that the “distribution right”, a term devised 
by a textbook author to label a concept, is relevant to Hong Kong; 
and is the meaning to be given to distribution. Having considered 
the matters raised in argument, having regard to the evidence and 
having noted the structure and content of the Copyright 
Ordinance, Cap.528, I am satisfied that the Ordinance does, and 
was intended to cover, copies in digital format.  The Magistrate did 
not confuse the concept of distribution of data/information with 
distribution of copies as the Appellant alleges.  Further, the 
Appellant’s argument that ‘copies’ must involve physical material 
entities has not been established.  Accordingly the appeal against 
conviction fails.”29 
 
                                                        
27 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2007] 2 HKC 1, 9. 
28 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2007] 2 HKC 1, 21. 
29 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2007] 2 HKC 1, 18. 
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THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL DECISION 
All of the other judges of the Court of Final Appeal agreed with the 
judgment of Ribeiro PJ. The Court upheld the decisions of the lower 
courts and rejected Chan’s appeal. Again, the arguments brought before 
the court were essentially that: (a) the word “copy” used in s118(1)(f) of 
the Copyright Ordinance meant that “an electronic copy can only exist 
as something stored in a physical object” 30 ; and (b) that “for 
‘distribution’ to occur, the distributor must first be in possession of the 
relevant copy which he then transfers to the recipient, after which he no 
longer has the distributed copy”31. It is clear, as Ribeiro PJ pointed out32, 
that the two arguments were very closely related, if not inseparable. 
 
COPY 
Dealing with the first part of Chan’s arguments Ribeiro PJ made the 
following statements:  
“I agree of course that an electronic copy must exist in some 
physical medium or environment and not in a vacuum. But as 
the evidence established and as everyday experience indicates, 
electronic data constituting a digital copy of a work can plainly 
be transmitted via the medium of the network of computers 
and cables making up the Internet. Electronic copies can thus 
plainly be transmitted without first being stored in a tangible 
article such as a CD or DVD to be physically handed over to a 
recipient.”33  
“It is of course true that an electronic copy will often be stored 
in a disk or some similar tangible object which is capable of and 
intended for physical delivery. But use of such a storage device 
is not an essential condition for the transfer or distribution of 
an electronic copy. An Internet network made up of linked 
                                                        
30 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 258. 
31 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 259. 
32 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 259. 
33 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 265. 
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computers is no less tangible and effective a medium for its 
transmission.”34 
“Plainly, electronic copies of copyright works can be bought, 
sold and delivered entirely via the Internet […]It is of course 
true that in some cases, such as with rentals, one would 
normally envisage persons renting and then returning disks 
containing electronic copies of the relevant works. But it does 
not follow that because one particular form of dealing with an 
electronic copy may require physical delivery of the storage 
device, all forms of dealing, and in particular distribution, of 
such copies must inevitably require similar physical handling, to 
the exclusion of delivery via the Internet. Indeed, technological 
advances are constantly being made with a view to eliminating 
the need for such physical delivery. Thus, an electronic copy of 
a ‘rented’ film may be sent to the recipient on the Internet, 
programmed to delete itself after a stated period. In other 
words, there is no factual imperative for dealings with, and in 
particular distribution of, electronic copies to be confined to 
the physical transfer of storage devices.”35 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
Chan’s counsel sought support for his distribution argument36 from the 
agreed statements concerning Articles 6 and 7 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty37 which states: 
“As used in these Articles, the expressions “copies” and “original 
and copies,” being subject to the right of distribution and the right of 
rental under the said Articles, refer exclusively to fixed copies that 
can be put into circulation as tangible objects.38 
                                                        
34 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 266. 
35 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 266. 
36 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 267. 
37 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, Geneva, 20 
December 1996. 
38 Article 6, footnote 5, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright 
Treaty, Geneva, 20 December 1996. 
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Ribeiro PJ was of the opinion that this merely “represented an 
agreement as to minimum levels of copyright protection to be 
implemented”39 by the contracting parties of the Treaty40 and did not 
confine the meaning of “distribution”. He stated: 
“There is also no legal reason to confine distribution of copies to 
cases involving delivery by physical means.  “Distribution” is not 
defined in the Ordinance and should be given its ordinary 
meaning.  In the present case, the evidence showed that upon 
being accessed by downloaders seeking to obtain a copy of the 
relevant film, the appellant’s computer reproduced the infringing 
electronic copy (which remained on his hard disk) in the form of 
packets of digital information which were sent to the downloaders 
and reassembled by their computers in the correct sequence to 
constitute an entire infringing copy of that film.  In my view, that 
process in aggregate is aptly described as involving the appellant’s 
creation of infringing electronic copies (transient or otherwise) of 
the film and their distribution directly or indirectly to each member 
of each swarm.”41 
He went on to state: 
“It does not by any means follow that the scope of the 
s118(1)(f) offence should be [confined to fixed copies], if, as a 
matter of its proper construction, it provides more extensive 
protection. This is especially so where, as in the present case, 
the Court is not concerned with ascertaining the scope of a 
rightholder’s distribution right nor with conduct permissible 
after exhaustion of that right – which was the relevant focus of 
the Treaty – but with the unlicenced dissemination of multiple 
infringing copies via the Internet.”42  
The other aspect of the distribution argument submitted by Chan’s 
counsel was that  
                                                        
39 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 268. 
40 Although the People’s Republic of China acceded to the WIPO Copyright Treaty on 
9 March 2007, the Treaty does not, at the time of writing, apply to the Hong Kong or 
Macau Special Administrative Regions. See 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1989C> 25 January 2008. 
41 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 266. 
42 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 268. 
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“[Chan] did not transfer any infringing copy away from his 
computer. Rather, copies were only created by the downloading 
activities of the members of the swarm. In other words, there 
was no distribution since the appellant did not transfer any 
copy previously in his possession to the downloading swarm. 
He merely enabled them to make copies of their own.”43 
Ribeiro rejected this argument on the facts: 
“It is of course true, but not relevant, that the initial infringing 
copy of each film remained on the appellant's hard disk. As 
previously stated, the magistrate accepted the evidence as 
establishing that electronic copies duplicating that initial 
infringing copy were generated by the appellant's computer and 
were then sent to the downloaders as a stream of digital packets 
designed to be reconstituted as entire, viewable films. 
Accordingly, even assuming for the sake of this argument, that 
[Chan’s counsel] Mr Pun’s approach to the meaning of 
‘distribution’ is correct - namely, that it requires the transfer of a 
copy in the distributor's possession to the recipient - the 
findings were to the effect that the appellant did create and did 
have possession of such a copy (transiently or otherwise) for 
distribution to the downloading swarm.”44 
In obiter, Ribeiro PJ suggested that an act of distribution may not even 
require possession of a copy by the distributor: 
“[I]f the evidence had been different and if it had shown that 
no further electronic copy of any film was ever created by the 
appellant's computer and that no such copy was ever 
transmitted to the downloaders; but that the appellant had 
enabled the recipients by some technological means to create 
infringing electronic copies of the three films on their own 
computers, the question would still arise as to whether such 
conduct on his part could constitute the ‘distribution of 
infringing copies’. The fact would remain that by his use of 
technology the appellant had caused reproductions of the 
                                                        
43 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 271. 
44 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 271. 
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infringing copies on his computer to appear on the computers 
of the downloaders, even if the process did not involve the 
prior creation by his computer of an electronic copy (transient 
or otherwise). I leave open the question whether such conduct 
might nevertheless be caught by s 118(1)(f).”45 
 
COMMENTARY 
The relevance of this case to Australian law, and indeed other 
jurisdictions with similar criminal copyright provisions, will depend 
largely on the willingness of the Courts to take a similarly wide view of 
what is meant by “distribution”. In this case, it is clear from the 
judgement that it is not necessary for a court to find that the copyright 
owner’s right of distribution had been infringed (if such a right is 
recognised in the jurisdiction), the article merely needs to be an 
infringing copy and any distribution (whether the distribution itself is 
infringing or not) will be an offence.  
What was not exactly clear from the case was the approach courts may 
take when they assess the extent of the distribution when dealing with 
the fragmented method Bit Torrent uses to disseminate files. If a Bit 
Torrent user seeds a swarm of 40 other users and distributes a different 
part of the file to each user, the swarm could still produce 40 complete 
copies even if the seeder disconnects; 40 copies could be created 
independently of the original seeder. It is likely that the courts would 
take the view that the defendant had distributed copies to the 40 users, if 
they follow the obiter dicta of Ribeiro PJ, but this raises the awkward 
question of exactly where the liability for the distribution ends. Perhaps 
more prosecutors will resort to attempt or conspiracy charges to avoid 
answering this question. We may never know the answer. Another 
method of file sharing called one-click hosting seems to be overtaking 
peer-to-peer software like Bit Torrent as the standard method for 
disseminating infringing copies46. In this system, the user uploads the file 
                                                        
45 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 271. 
46 See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-click_hosting> 25 January 2008 and Choi, 
Bryan H “The Grokster Dead-End” (2006) 19 Havard Journal of Law and Technology 
393. 
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to a website ostensibly for the purposes of file storage, and receives a 
URL47 which can be used to download the file at a later date. The URL 
address can be posted on forums in exactly the way Chan posted his 
torrent files. Other users can then download the files at the maximum 
speed of their internet connection, rather than being restricted by the 
available bandwidth of a seeder’s connection. This allows a much faster 
rate of file transfer and consequently a far greater volume of data to be 
received. Future non-commercial criminal cases (and indeed civil actions 
against the host services) are more likely to arise from the use of this 
type of file hosting service than from peer-to-peer file trading protocols. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This case was the first real opportunity to observe the application of 
criminal copyright law in file-sharing cases. The meaning of distribution 
has been clarified, but the case also highlights the evidentiary difficulties 
of proving prejudicial effect. There are likely to be more cases of this 
nature in the future and it will be interesting to see how the law develops 
to address this problem. 
 
                                                        
47 A Uniform Resource Locator (URL) allows computers to locate pages on the 
Internet. The text in the address bar of a web browser shows the URL.  
